ESSAY

Bowers v. Hardwick: Precedent by
Personal Predilection
Thomas B. Stoddardt
Conservative legal critics of Earl Warren's Supreme Court,
both of its major decisions and of its general direction, are now
especially powerful and vocal. Their ranks include the current attorney general of the United States and the new chief justice of the
Court. The critics are not of one voice, but they often express one
grievance with particular vehemence: that in rendering decisions,
the Warren Court was concerned less with adherence to legal principles than with vindication of the personal views of the particular
justices then sitting on the bench.
This characterization is unfair. The justices with whom
the Warren Court is most closely identified-Black, Douglas,
Goldberg, Brennan, Marshall, and Chief Justice Warren himself-disdained neither legal principles nor legal reasoning. Rather,
they subscribed to the concept that the principles of the Constitution should not be frozen in time, but should grow in meaning as
the country itself evolves. Their boldest decisions reflected that
philosophy more than they expressed the personal opinions of the
dominant justices.
Nevertheless, the critics of the Warren Court have helped
bring to light a significant concern that liberals too often dismiss:
judges do abuse their oath of office when they depart from the
rules in order to achieve a result they believe to be desirable on
other grounds. Courts should decide cases by reference to precedent and logic, and they should take procedure seriously.
There are instances in which the Supreme Court has done violence to this idea, but-curiously-the most flagrant example
comes not from the Warren Court of the 1960s, but from the Burt Executive Director, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. and Adjunct
Associate Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.

Bowers v. Hardwick
ger Court of the 1980s. It is Bowers v. Hardwick,1 the decision
from last summer in which the Court upheld the constitutionality
of a Georgia statute criminalizing certain sex acts under the term
"sodomy."
A careful review of the case, including the decisions of the two
lower courts, makes clear that the Court's opinion in Hardwick
rests upon nothing more substantial than the collective distaste of
the five justices in the majority for the conduct under scrutiny.
The opinion is, to be blunt, devoid of logic. Moreover, in order to
reach its conclusion, the majority seriously distorted the nature
and posture of the issue presented to the Court. Bowers v. Hardwick is judicial decision making by fiat rather than reason.
The statute under consideration in Hardwick defines sodomy
as "any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the
mouth or anus of another."'2 The conduct can be either homosexual
or heterosexual, and the participants married to one another or
not. The offense is a felony, and it carries a penalty of up to twenty
years in prison.
The statute was challenged in 1983 as an unconstitutional infringement of the federal constitutional right to privacy in a rather
perfunctory complaint filed in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Georgia by Michael Hardwick and John
and Mary Doe. Hardwick, it was alleged, was a twenty-nine-yearold "practicing homosexual, who regularly engages in private homosexual acts and will do so in the future."'3 The Does were a lawfully married couple who sought "to engage in the [proscribed]
sexual activity . . . in the privacy of their home." The complaint
also alleged that Hardwick himself had already been arrested for
"sodomy" in his own home, although the case had not been
presented to a grand jury, and that he therefore lived "in imminent danger of arrest, prosecution and imprisonment." The Does
had not been arrested, but, it was claimed, had been "chilled and
deterred" from engaging in the conduct. The plaintiffs sought a
declaratory judgment that the statute violated the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment and the first amendment
guarantees of freedom of expression and association.4
In April of 1985, the district court judge issued a terse order
dismissing the complaint in total. He ruled that the Does had not
106 S.Ct. 2841 (1986).
Id. at 2842 n.1.
3 Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir. 1985).
' Hardwick, 106 S.Ct. at 2842 & n.2.
'
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shown that they were "in immediate danger of sustaining direct
injury," and that their claim was therefore not justiciable. 5 As for
Hardwick, the judge concluded that his claim was "foreclosed" by
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney,6 in which the Supreme Court
had affirmed without opinion a three-judge federal district court
decision upholding a Virginia "sodomy" statute.
The plaintiffs appealed the district court decision to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, and succeeded in having it overturned. The appellate panel agreed with
the lower court that the Does lacked standing. But, by a vote of
two to one, it reinstated the claims made by Hardwick. Doe v.
Commonwealth's Attorney, the court said, was not controlling,
largely because the case's value as precedent was unclear. More importantly, however, it ruled that Hardwick's constitutional challenge had possible merit. The court reviewed the principal Supreme Court privacy decisions, from Meyer v. Nebraska in 1923 to
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health in 1983,8 and determined that in sum they prevented the states "from unduly interfering in certain individual decisions critical to personal autonomy," including certain "intimate associations" such as marriage.
It then drew an analogy between sex in marriage and Hardwick's
desire to engage in sexual relations with another consenting adult.
The "resemblance" of the two to one another, coupled with Hardwick's intent to carry out his activity in seclusion, led the court to
conclude that the Georgia statute "implicate[d] a fundamental
right of Michael Hardwick." The Eleventh Circuit expressed its
holding as follows:
The activity [Hardwick] hopes to engage in is quintessentially
private and lies at the heart of an intimate association beyond
the proper reach of state regulation. . . . We therefore remand this case for trial, at which time the State must prove in
order to prevail that it has a compelling interest in regulating
this behavior and that this statute is the most narrowly drawn
means of safeguarding that interest.'
As that final sentence makes clear, the Eleventh Circuit did
not strike down the statute. Rather, the court identified the proper
5 Id.
6 425 U.S. 901 (1976), affirming 403 F.Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975).
Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1204.
8 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
7

Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
9 Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1210-13, 1212-13.
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standard of review to be used by the district court at trial, where
presumably Georgia would seek to prove its "compelling interest"
in criminalizing the conduct in question. The standard, applicable
whenever a "fundamental" constitutional right is in jeopardy, is a
high one, and consequently the state's burden of proof would be
extremely onerous. But the appellate court did not take the final
step of applying the standard to the statute-such a step would
have been premature since the district court had yet to receive any
evidence in the case-and the court certainly did not declare the
Georgia statute unconstitutional.
It was in that posture that Bowers v. Hardwick arrived at the
Supreme Court. I mentioned at the outset that the majority in
Hardwick upheld the Georgia statute by a vote of five to four; but
that fact is less interesting and noteworthy than the manner in
which the Court acted. The majority opinion, written by Justice
White, is an extremely shoddy bit of work on at least three scores.
First, the issue before the Court was clearly not whether the
Georgia statute was constitutional or unconstitutional, but rather
which constitutional standard of review the trial court should apply in considering that question. Nonetheless, the five justices in
the majority rushed forward to reach the ultimate question of constitutionality, in the absence of any ruling below on that question
and in the absence of any record of trial. The Court first rejected
the "compelling interest" standard that the Eleventh Circuit had
adopted. It then proceeded to decide whether the statute satisfied
the other principal constitutional standard of review-the so-called
"rational basis" test-and concluded that it did, with almost no
consideration of what state interest the Georgia legislature might
have seen as rationally related to the statute.
In resolving the issue of constitutionality, the Court undeniably exceeded its authority. It also ignored the long-standing tenet
that constitutional decisions, because of their gravity, should be issued only on the basis of a well-developed record and well-framed
issues. The majority was apparently so eager to hand down a ruling
on sexual privacy that it either overlooked or deliberately disregarded the posture of the case before it. Given the importance of
the ultimate constitutional question raised in Hardwick, the majority's zeal is more than improper; it verges on scandalous.
In addition, the majority went out of its way to reformulate
the issue presented by the case in order to rebuke homosexual-and only homosexual-"sodomy." The Georgia statute covers
oral or anal intercourse committed by any two people-homosexual or heterosexual, unmarried or married. The two
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courts below dealt with the statute in its entirety; they made no
distinctions among categories of individuals subject to the prohibition on sodomy. The Supreme Court, however, characterized the
case as one concerning "the fundamental rights of homosexuals,"
and specifically postponed the issue of the statute's application to
"other acts of sodomy." 10 It reframed Hardwick, converting it from
a "sexual privacy" case to a "gay rights" case. The Eleventh Circuit had agreed with the trial court that the Does lacked standing,
leaving Michael Hardwick as the sole plaintiff, but that court never
treated the case as anything other than a full facial attack. Moreover, the complaint in the case challenged the statute fully, not
merely as it applied to Michael Hardwick, to the Does, or to anyone else.
The Court should have addressed Bowers v. Hardwick as
presented by the complaint and by the two lower court opinions.
That the majority chose to treat the question as one of an alleged
' was a sur"fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy"11
prising innovation; no one else had ever characterized it in that
way. The majority's reformulation of Hardwick reinforces the impression that the justices had made up their minds on the proper
result beforehand, and then tailored the case to suit their particular prejudices.
Finally, the majority's reasoning on the merits was exceedingly
weak. The majority rejected completely the argument, which had
convinced the Eleventh Circuit, that the Supreme Court's precedents on privacy imply a general right to "intimate association" of
a sexual nature. Instead, the Court recited the familiar litany of
privacy cases to date, including in its list decisions that predate the
formal recognition of a constitutional right to privacy, and then
attached to each case a particular label.' 2 Pierce v. Society of Sisters and Meyer v. Nebraska, said the majority, dealt with "child
rearing and education." Skinner v. Oklahoma concerned "procreation"; Loving v. Virginia, "marriage"; Griswold v. Connecticut and
Eisenstadt v. Baird, "contraception"; and Roe v. Wade, "abortion."' 3 After setting forth its list, the majority then merely offered
its conclusion:
10 106 S.Ct. at 2843, 2842 n.2.
11 Id. at 2844.
12

Id. at 2843-44.

13

Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390

(1923); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Accepting the decisions in these cases and the above description of them, we think it evident that none of the rights announced in those cases bears any resemblance to the claimed
constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy that is asserted in this case. No connection between family, marriage or procreation on the one hand and homosexual
14
activity on the other has been demonstrated.
By sorting out cases according to labels adopted in previous
decisions, the majority acted in a manner more befitting mail
clerks than justices of the Supreme Court. Judges, particularly at
the level of the Supreme Court, should apply real analysis to the
issues before them. Bowers v. Hardwick is, unfortunately, little
more than judgment by pigeonhole. "Sodomy," in the view of the
majority, does not fit within the category "child rearing and education." Nor does it come within the terms "procreation," "marriage," "contraception," or "abortion." Therefore, Michael Hardwick loses.
Ipse dixit can never suffice for a decision by the Supreme
Court of the United States, and, at bottom, Bowers v. Hardwick is
just that. The Court owed the rest of us, who must abide by its
pronouncements, an explanation for its decision-particularly
when important lower courts, including the Eleventh Circuit and
the Court of Appeals of New York State, had interpreted the
Court's previous privacy cases to lead to exactly the opposite
result. 15
The decision in Hardwick is particularly difficult to square
with Eisenstadt v. Baird, in which the Court invalidated a Massachusetts statute forbidding single people from obtaining contraceptives to prevent pregnancy. In effect, Eisenstadt extended the privacy right enunciated in Griswold to the unmarried. The Court,
through Justice Brennan, wrote:
If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.16
Under Eisenstadt, an unmarried person may choose to engage in
sexual conduct with another adult for purposes other than procrea, Hardwick, 106 S.Ct. at 2844.
25 Hardwick, 760 F.2d 1202; People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434
N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980).
16405 U.S. at 453.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[54:648

tion, and the government may not interfere with that decision.
That is precisely the choice made by Michael Hardwick on the
night he was arrested. It is not sufficient for the Court to distinguish Eisenstadt from Hardwick merely by invoking the term
"contraception" to describe the earlier case. At bottom, the two
cases concern the same activity. If the Court believed otherwise, it
should have explained precisely why. Semantics alone will not do.
In contrast to the majority's opinion, the four dissenters in
Hardwick, under Justice Blackmun's lead, attempted to formulate
a theory to fill in the gaps left by the previous cases on privacy. "I
believe," Justice Blackmun wrote, "we must analyze [Hardwick's]
claim in the light of the values that underlie the constitutional
right to privacy." The most significant value he discerned from the
previous cases was "the fundamental interest all individuals have
in controlling the nature of their intimate associations with
others." He also inferred from those cases two different aspects of
privacy: a "decisional aspect" that pushes certain decisions beyond
the reach of government intrusion, and a "spatial aspect" that protects certain places, such as the home. He concluded that both aspects of privacy were implicated in Hardwick; he then determined
that the Georgia statute should be subject to strict scrutiny in that
Hardwick's action "involves no real interference with the rights of
others, for the mere knowledge that other individuals do not adhere to one's value system cannot be a legally cognizable interest
. . . let alone an interest that can justify invading the houses,
hearts and minds of citizens who choose to live their lives
17
differently.'
The majority, to reinforce its conclusion, put forward the undeniable fact that sodomy statutes are very old. "Proscriptions
against that conduct have ancient roots," wrote Justice White. 8
But the Court's reliance on history in Hardwick is only another
manifestation of its unprincipled approach to the case. In past privacy cases, the Court has felt at liberty to depart from history
when the interest at stake seemed sufficiently important. In Loving
v. Virginia, for example, it invalidated a statute forbidding miscegenation despite the fact, noted by the Court, that marriage between partners of different races traditionally had been prohibited
by most states in the country. In Roe v. Wade, the Court inferred a
right to abortion from the Constitution even though abortions had
been criminally prohibited in virtually every state for decades. In
1" 106 S.Ct. at 2848, 2850-53, 2856.
18 Id. at 2844.
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the Court's modern past, the mere longevity of a statute, even
when the law fits into a legal pattern or "tradition," has never
before been deemed a bar to judicial intervention.
The majority's abhorrence for Michael Hardwick's sexual activities blinded it to the need to explain how Georgia's dislike for
"deviant" sexual conduct constituted even a minimally rational basis for the statute. The critical constitutional question in Hardwick
was not what Michael Hardwick was doing in his bedroom, but
rather what the state of Georgia was doing there. To answer this
question, Justice White offered only "the presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable." He glibly remarked that "law is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws representing
essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed." 19 But courts
should be busy when laws threaten fundamental rights protected
by the Constitution. If Justice White's quip is the new law, the
courts will have very little to do in the name of the fourteenth
amendment.
The Court was willing to overturn legislative acts based on
"essentially moral choices" when it struck down laws prohibiting
contraceptive sales and abortion. Why should Bowers v. Hardwick
be different? What is it about the claim in Hardwick that sets it
apart from other privacy claims? The utter lack of reasoning in the
majority's opinion, in tandem with the procedural manipulation of
the case, strongly suggests that the explanation lies in the emotional response of five justices to the subject matter underlying the
case as they perceived it, or rather, as they reconstituted it: the
subject of homosexuality.
The tone of the opinion also leads to this conclusion. At one
point, the majority resorted to a flippancy verging on contempt; it
described Michael Hardwick's invocation of constitutional protection as "at best, facetious." The four dissenters also may have believed that antipathy to homosexuality was at the root of the majority's decision, for their opinion contains a caustic reference
to
20
the Court's "almost obsessive focus on homosexual activity."
Justice White and his four colleagues, it seems, simply do not
like homosexuality, and do not want to elevate or honor it by conferring on it the imprimatur of the Constitution of the United
States. As citizens, they are entitled to their point of view, however
" Id. at 2846, 2846.
20 Id. at 2846 (majority), 2849 (dissent).
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unfair or unreasoned it may be. But as judges of the highest court
in the land, they have a higher obligation than ordinary citizens.
They have a duty to look beyond their personal disapproval in interpreting the Constitution.
Bowers v. Hardwick is, fundamentally, lawmaking by personal
predilection-precisely the sort of judicial self-indulgence that the
critics of the Warren Court most often decry. It is a cavalier decision, without reference to either standard or principle and in blatant disregard of well-settled procedural rules.
Just two years ago, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, the same Court, in another opinion by Justice White,
struck down a decision by a small city in Texas to deny a zoning
permit to a home for the mentally retarded as based solely upon
"mere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which
are properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding. 2 1 In invalidating
the city's action as a violation of equal protection, the Court was
performing once again its most important function: counterbalancing the excesses of the elective branches of government, whether
federal or state, by reference to the Constitution, the charter
against which all acts of government are to be measured. In Hardwick, the Court did more than abdicate that role; the Court itself
became the engine of abuse by surrendering to, and then giving
voice to, the prejudices of its own members in precisely the manner
condemned by Cleburne.
The implications of the Hardwick case far transcend either
Michael Hardwick or the homosexual Americans for whom he
speaks. They should trouble anyone who believes in the rule of
law.

21

105 S.Ct. 3249, 3259 (1985).

